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Abstract 
 
 The purpose of this research was to examine whether it would be in the best 
interest of the Department of Defense to consider using currency hedging as a way to 
protect its budget from negative currency fluctuations in the US Dollar.  Specifically, the 
use of futures and options contracts was examined.  Overseas expenditure data was 
collected on the YEN and the EURO for Fiscal Years 2001 to 2007 and cross-referenced 
with the contract prices for the aforementioned hedges during the same period of time.  
Using an ex post facto analysis with the gathered data, the results show that hedging with 
futures or call options on the USD/EURO would have provided a tremendous overall 
savings to the DOD.  Currently the DOD does not hedge its budget against currency 
fluctuation.  The implication from this study is that the DOD should consider hedging its 
currency exposure and examine whether other methodologies might be more appropriate 
with other currencies or in other circumstances. 
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STRATEGIES FOR MINIMIZING MONETARY IN THE DEPARTMENT 
OF DEFENSE BUDGET THROUGH USE OF FINANCIAL 
DERIVATIVES 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
Overview 
 Each year the United States Department of Defense spends billions of dollars 
overseas in various locations throughout the world.  (GAO-05-800R)  This money is 
spent on maintenance of bases, housing of military personnel and their families, hiring 
local workers, and logistics, just to name a few.  These expenses, while vital to the 
interests of the United States, are becoming increasingly expensive due to the devaluation 
of the USD relative to the other currencies of the world.  This paper is an examination of 
some of the strategies currently available in the marketplace, which can help mitigate the 
effects of a depreciating dollar. 
Background 
The currency markets of the world fluctuate on a daily basis.  As a result, one 
currency may appreciate or depreciate relative to the value of another given currency.  
These fluctuations result from trade imbalances, differences in interest rates, 
governmental policies and economic productivity, just to name a few of the many factors.  
The result over time is that the purchasing power of one currency can either increase or 
decrease in comparison to another.   
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Over the course of the last several years, the DOD has lost hundred of millions of 
dollars due to the declining value of the U.S. Dollar, relative to the currencies of other 
countries in which the DOD expends funds. (GAO-05-800R)  According to the DOD 
Budget Accounts Listing Total Obligational Authority, Budget Authority, and Outlays 
reports for Fiscal Years 2002 to 2006, the total additional spending required as a result of 
a devalued USD was $559MM in 2002, $607MM in 2003, $54MM in 2004, $444MM in 
2005, and $478MM in 2006 for a total increase in spending of $2.142 billion.   Part of 
this problem is attributable to the fact that the current budgetary cycle used by the DOD 
requires forecasting of expected budgets and currency exchange rates, two years in 
advance of the actual expenditure of funds.    Because the expected future exchange rates 
and the actual spot rates can fluctuate a great degree this creates uncertainty for the DOD.  
In addition to not knowing whether the USD will buy more or less two years in the 
future, research shows that for the past several years, the value of the USD has declined 
significantly relative to other world currencies. (Dapice 2005)  To better illustrate this, 
Table 1 and Table 2 show the relationship of the USD/EURO and USD/YEN over a ten-
year period as a general overview.  Both charts were obtained with permission from 
www.kitco.com. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Figure 1 
7 Year USD vs. EURO 
 
 What is notable in this chart is the decline in value of the USD relative to the 
EURO since 2001.  The EURO is a fairly new currency and in the early years of its 
creation, not as many countries utilized the EURO as we have today.  The net result is 
that demand for the EURO has continued to increase as more member countries are being 
added to the EU and adopting the EURO. 
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Figure 2 
7 Year USD vs. Yen 
 
 
While the EURO is the currency utilized by many countries in the European 
Union, the Japanese YEN is utilized by only one country.  This chart showcases the 
fluctuating exchange rate for the past seven years between the USD and the YEN. 
To help alleviate the pressure of fluctuating currency values, the DOD currently 
uses a three-year, weighted average of the exchange rate in an attempt to forecast future 
exchange rates.  Correspondingly, DOD maintains a Foreign Currency Fluctuation 
Account (FCFA) designed to provide extra funds to cover the difference between 
budgeted exchange rates and actual exchange rates.  When a surplus is realized on a 
currency trade, these extra funds are added to the FCFA coffers.  Likewise, when a 
negative currency trade is made, funds are distributed from the FCFA to cover the loss.  
Even if the USD should appreciate in value relative to other currencies, a problem still 
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remains – budgeting uncertainty.  This uncertainty is due to the fact that the there are 
currently no known models available to accurately predict the exact exchange rate of 
currencies in the future.  As a result, the DOD is unable to accurately know how much 
money will be required in its budget for future overseas expenditures.  Just as DOD 
decision makers want to know with certainty that a specific weapon system will perform 
as expected at any given date in the future, the need for these decision makers to know 
their budgets will be adequate at any given time in the future is also critical to effectively 
operating a military. 
In the corporate world, the influences of these currency fluctuations have been 
minimized through the use of various financial derivatives: namely, futures contracts, 
swaps, forward contracts, and options on futures.  Another method utilized by Multi-
National Corporations is the use of operational hedges in addition to financial hedges.  
According to a paper published by David Carter, Christos Patzalis and Betty Simkins in 
2003 MNCs can hedge their risk to fluctuations in the foreign currency markets by using 
financial hedges (options, futures, etc) or by using operational hedges such as moving 
cost centers or centers of production to another country.  (Carter, Patzalis and Simkins 
2003)  While the use of operational hedging in the corporate world may be viable, it may 
not always be practical in the DOD.  Because of the unique role and purpose of the DOD, 
it may not be practical to move operations simply due to risks related to foreign currency 
exposure. 
One of the challenges to this study is that there is little existing research in using 
these techniques for a non-profit organization.  While studies on the use of derivatives by 
non-profits may be limited, there is some information available in company annual 
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reports.  The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), based in Geneva, does 
make use of derivatives to hedge against currency fluctuations.  According to the 
Consolidated Financial Statement of the ICRC 2006, page 379, "The ICRC's foreign 
operations are considered an integral part of the operations in Geneva.  The assets and 
liabilities of those operations are translated into Swiss francs at foreign exchange rates 
ruling at the dates of the transactions."  The report further states that the derivatives they 
commonly use to hedge against currency fluctuation are forward contracts and swaps.  
(ICRC 2006)   While the annual report mentions the use of these derivatives, it does not 
explain what are the results of these transactions.   
Much of the theory and practice in today’s for-profit organizations is not only to 
mitigate loss due to currency fluctuations, but also to use various financial derivatives to 
generate profit.  Because the Department of Defense is a non-profit organization, the 
focus of this paper will be limited to loss mitigation. 
Problem Statement 
Due to the fluctuations in the world currency markets and the decline of the USD 
for the past several years, the DOD has had to allocate extra resources to cover these 
unexpected costs of doing business. 
Purpose and Research Question 
The primary purpose of this research is to assess the practicality of utilizing some 
of the financial derivative products available on the market today in an effort to mitigate 
losses due to the declining value of the USD and to build stability in the DOD budgetary 
process. 
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Methodology 
This research utilizes an ex post facto methodology.  Data has been gathered from 
the 2001 to the 2007 fiscal year DOD budget to compare the budgeted exchange rates vs. 
the actual exchange rates.  In addition, data has been collected on the cost of the various 
financial derivatives throughout the same time period.  This data will be used to examine 
what would have been the result had the DOD utilized futures contracts or options on 
futures contracts as a currency hedge in its budget. 
Significance 
 The significance of this research is that by potentially mitigating the losses due to 
the devaluation of the USD, there is the potential for millions of dollars in annual savings 
(GAO-05-800R), which can be used to fund other critical projects throughout the DOD. 
Assumptions/Limitations 
The limitations of performing an ex post facto analysis is whether or not a direct 
causal statement can be made that the implementation of various financial derivative 
instruments will lead to budgetary stability and savings for the DOD in the future.  It is 
assumed that the world markets contain enough liquidity to allow DOD entry into these 
markets without significantly influencing the price of the underlying derivative. 
In an effort to better understand hedging options and strategies along with the risk 
management principals that underlie such strategies, a review of some key hedging 
products is in order.  The first item examined is risk mitigation, followed by the use of 
futures.  Next are forward contracts.  Finally, options on futures contracts will be 
discussed. 
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II. Literature Review 
 
Risk Mitigation 
 To put it simply, one of the primary purposes of using derivatives to hedge 
currency transactions is for risk mitigation.  In a journal article written by Dr. Rene Stulz, 
the editor of the Journal of Finance, the author examines the differences between modern 
financial theory and what is observed in actual corporate practice as it applies to hedging.  
According to Dr. Stulz, modern financial theory suggests that hedging is designed to 
minimize variance; however, much of the actual hedging that happens in the marketplace 
is designed for the “elimination of costly lower-tail outcomes -- that is to reduce the 
expected costs of financial trouble while preserving a company’s ability to exploit any 
comparative advantage in risk-bearing it might have.”  (Stulz 1996, pg. 8) 
 As an example of what can happen when a company chooses not to hedge its 
currency risks, Stulz cites the example of Daimler-Benz in 1995.  (Stulz 1996)  It was at 
this time the company reported a first-half loss of DM 1.56 Billion in losses, which was 
the largest loss in the company’s 109-year history.  The company attributed this loss to 
the weakening USD, which had declined in value to the DM by 14 percent during the 
same period of time.  By refusing to hedge against what Dr. Stulz would describe as 
“costly lower-tail outcomes” Daimler Benz realized significant losses. 
 Another example of a corporation employing currency-hedging practices as a way 
to minimize the negative implications as a result of the decline in the value of the USD is 
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seen with Merck & Co.  In a 1989 article by Judy Lewent and John Kearney, employees 
of Merck & Co., the authors mention that this multi-national pharmaceutical company 
was under increasing pressure to maintain its competitive advantage in the global 
marketplace.  One key area they examined was in the use of currency hedging.  (Chew 
2001)  As a result of their research, Lewent and Kearney developed a five-step process 
which included: exchange rate forecasting, analysis of the impact to overall strategic 
plan, hedging rationale, choosing which financial instruments to use, and how to 
implement the hedging program.  After determining the need for a currency hedging 
program, the company began working with Professor Darrell Duffie of Stanford 
University to develop a computer model to determine the effectiveness of various 
hedging strategies using a Monte Carlo simulation.  For proprietary reasons, the authors 
did not provide the exact details of their hedging program other than mention the 
preference for options contracts utilizing various strike prices and expiration dates.  They 
mention their methodology of hedging (as is in line with Dr. Stulz’ theory on avoiding 
costly lower-tail outcomes) was designed to mitigate the negative impact of USD 
devaluation, rather than as a way to minimize variance. (Chew 2001) 
 Currency exchange rate risk is part of the overall enterprise risk management 
which corporations need to examine.  (Nocco and Stulz 2006)  “Through hedging, firms 
can eliminate their exposure to many risks at low cost.  For instance, a foreign exchange 
hedging program utilizing forward contracts has typically very low transaction costs. 
When hedging is cheap, there is no good economic reason for a firm not to hedge 
economic risks if it faces the possibility of cash flow shortfalls that could force it to give 
up valuable projects.  Through hedging, the firm incurs small costs but increases the 
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probability that it will be able to implement all positive net present value projects 
available to it.”  (Nocco and Stulz 2006) 
 Despite the benefits achieved by hedging one’s currency transactions, another 
question arises which is how much of percentage should a company hedge its currency 
risks?  In a 1992 survey conducted by Walter Dolde of the Fortune 500 companies and 
cited in Dr. Stulz’ article, almost 90 percent of respondents said they estimate their 
hedging ratios based on their expectations of future FX moves.  (Stulz 1996)  In other 
words according to this study, the respondents were more likely to hedge 20 percent or 
less of their currency exposure if they expected currency movements to move favorably 
for their company.  On the other hand, if these same respondents believed there was 
greater potential in a negative currency move, they might be more inclined to hedge up to 
100 percent of their currency exposure. 
Simply said, the extent to which one’s currency exposure is hedged is directly 
related to the prognostications of the managers whose job it is to hedge said risk.  For 
example, if the currency manager for a US-based company believed that the USD would 
appreciate relative to a currency in which his company was to trade, then he would likely 
be more inclined to hedge a smaller portion of that exposure, if at all.  His expectation is 
that the USD will appreciate and provide an additional profit.  On the other hand, if the 
same manager expected the opposite scenario, it would be reasonable for the opposite 
transactions to occur.  Lastly, if the same manager was somewhere in the middle on 
whether the USD was to appreciate or depreciate, he would likely engage in a hedge that 
reflected his estimation 
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 The concept that risk mitigation is important to a corporation is clearly seen 
throughout literature on the topic.  Hedging currency exposure is one of the ways a 
company can minimize its risks.  Now we will examine some of the tools used in the 
marketplace today to provide a hedge for currency.  
Futures Contracts 
 A futures contract is simply an agreement between two parties to conduct a 
transaction at a future date, at a specified price.  (CME 2006)  While this type of 
arrangement may have been happening throughout human history for thousands of years, 
it was not until 1848 when an official exchange was created in the United States to 
provide an open market for such trading. 
 Futures were originally developed to help create equilibrium for both the buyers 
and sellers of commodity products.  Because of market dynamics, farmers were unable to 
get a high price for their product, such as corn, in the months immediately following the 
harvest.  By the same token, buyers of these products had to pay a hefty premium if they 
wanted to purchase these products out of season.  The net result was a large variance in 
prices for certain goods depending on the season and availability of these goods. (CME 
2006) 
 With the creation of the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) and the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange (CME), farmers and consumers had an organized market in which 
to arrange the price, quantity and future date of the transaction.  For example, if a farmer 
wanted to guarantee he would receive $100/ton for corn with a scheduled delivery in the 
month of August, he could go to the CBOT and try to find a buyer who would agree to 
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such terms.  Because the CBOT provided a market in which many farmers and 
consumers could come together and bid for various products, prices and delivery dates, 
prices became much more stable.  The added benefit for each party in the transaction was 
to know in advance the exact price each would pay or receive for the underlying 
commodity.   This provided a great deal of stability.  Farmers could now know how much 
they could expect to earn before they even planted, while consumers could know in 
advance what their costs were going to be.  (CME 2006)  To mitigate the risk of default 
by either the buyer or seller, each party has to provide a partial payment to a neutral third 
party that acts as an escrow agent. 
 Today, exchanges such as the CBOT exist throughout the world.  They continue 
to provide a market for farmed products such as coffee, corn, orange juice, cattle, etc. 
However, these markets have grown to also include financial products. (CME 2006)  
Futures on indexes such as the S&P 500 and on the currencies of several countries now 
exist.  The principles that were behind the creation of the original futures markets are 
now being applied to the world of finance. 
 These futures contracts on currency can also help stabilize unexpected 
imbalances.  For example, if Company A in the United States knows it will make a 
purchase of automobiles from Company B in Germany next October, but believes that the 
value of the USD will decline compared with that of the EURO, then Company A can 
purchase an October futures contract on the EURO in the open market.  This gives 
Company A the ability to trade USD for EUROs at a pre-set exchange rate in October 
and then use those EUROs to pay the German manufacturer. 
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 One of the advantages to the futures market is that futures are traded on an open 
exchange and provide a great deal of liquidity.  (CME 2006)  If any party to a transaction 
wishes to exit the position, that party simply makes an opposite transaction.  Utilizing the 
previous example, Company A could decide to sell a futures contract for the same 
amount with the same expiration.  The result is a net cancellation of the contract.  
Another advantage is that futures contracts are traded in a similar manner as stocks are 
traded on a stock exchange; that is, the buyer and seller do not know each other, nor do 
they necessarily care.  These parties are simply concerned about either buying or selling 
the underlying entity.  This is a result of the enormous liquidity available by having a 
large pool of both buyers and sellers. (CME 2006)   
 Upon liquidation of a futures contract two alternatives are available – cash 
settlement or physical delivery.  “A party to a futures contract has two choices on 
liquidation of the position.  First, the position can be liquidated prior to the settlement 
date.  For this purpose, the party must take an offsetting position in the same contract.  
For the buyer of a futures contract, this means selling the same number of identical 
futures contracts: for the seller of a futures contract, this means buying the same number 
if identical futures contracts.  The alternative is to wait until the settlement date.  At that 
time the party purchasing a futures contract liquidates the position by delivering the 
underlying at the agreed-upon price.  For some futures contracts, settlement is made in 
cash only.  Such contracts are referred to as cash-only settlement contracts.”  (Fabozzi 
and Peterson 2003, pg. 85) 
 One of the disadvantages to the futures market is that the size of the contracts is 
standardized and may not fit all situations.  For example, one contract on soybeans is 
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equal to 5,000 bushels.  (CBOT 2007)  If someone does not need that many bushels, then 
futures contracts may not work very well.  Another disadvantage is that the delivery dates 
are also standardized.  Again, if an individual has need for delivery in a month that does 
not fall in one of the standardized months, then the futures market may not be a 
satisfactory method of trading. (CME 2006) 
 
Forward Contracts 
 According to the book Analysis of Derivatives for the CFA Program by Don M. 
Chance, Ph.D., “A forward contract is an agreement between two parties in which one 
party, the buyer, agrees to buy from the other party, the seller, an underlying asset or 
other derivative at a future date at a price established at the start of the contract.”  
(Chance 2003, pg. 26)  Forward contracts are similar to futures contracts; the major 
difference is that they are traded in the over-the-counter market and are direct agreements 
between two entities.  (CME 2006)  The advantage to the forward contract market is that 
the details of the contract can be custom tailored to the needs of the two parties when it 
comes to size of contract and delivery date.  The disadvantage lies in the fact that because 
these contracts are customized, there is less liquidity in the market in the event either 
party wishes to buy or sell their portion of the contract. 
 Using the previous example, Company A may plan to purchase a fixed number of 
vehicles from Company B, requiring a payment in EUROs.  Rather than using the open 
market to purchase a futures contract on the EURO, Company A may instead deal 
directly with Company B and agree in advance on the date of the exchange, the amount 
that is to be exchanged, and the exchange rate to be used.  This direct deal can be 
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advantageous to both parties, but because they do not use an intermediary exchange, the 
risk of default by one or both parties is increased.  In addition, if Company A wishes to 
get out of the deal, it must try to find someone who will purchase their portion of the 
contract.  If another company purchased Company A’s contract, then the new company 
would be obligated to the same terms and conditions originally stipulated.  (CME 2006) 
 
Options on Futures 
 The Chicago Mercantile Exchange, as do many other exchanges, offers another 
alternative for individuals or companies seeking to find a way to hedge against the risks 
of currency fluctuations – options on futures contracts. According to CME 2006 pg. 81 
“these contracts offer the buyer the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell an 
underlying futures contract at a particular price.”  By having the “right, but not the 
obligation” to buy or sell the futures contract, the risk to the buyer is dramatically 
reduced.  For example, when using a standard futures contract, the risks can be enormous.  
For example let us say the current USD was worth one EURO and a futures contract 
specified an equal one-for-one exchange rate at some date in the future.  Now let us 
assume that the current spot exchange rate at the time of the contract expiration was 
actually one USD for five EUROs.  The EURO is now one-fifth the value of the USD.  
The person or company who had agreed to a futures contract on a one-for-one basis 
would pay (in USD) five times the going exchange rate, while the person on the other 
side of the transaction would receive five times the value for the same amount of goods.  
This is one of the hazards of trading in the futures or forward market. 
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 For this reason, options on futures were created.  If we continue using this same 
scenario, but this time the buyer purchased an option instead of a futures contract, the 
buyer would have the ability to decide whether or not to exercise his right to trade at the 
agreed futures exchange rate, or to simply let the option contract expire and trade at the 
current market spot rates.  (CME 2006)  By selling the option for whatever value, if any, 
still remained or simply letting it expire and then trading the currency on the open 
market, the buyer of the option would limit his losses to the costs of the transaction.   
 Because of the ability to guarantee a buyer’s downside to risk, while at the same 
time providing room for upside appreciation, options are priced at a premium to either 
forward or futures contracts.  (CME 2006)  In other words, the buyer of the option knows 
at the time of purchase what the maximum costs of the transactions will be.  For example, 
if the buyer purchases a USD/EURO option that guarantees an exchange rate of 1.40 
EUROS by the time of expiration and the premium cost on the transaction brings the 
realized rate of exchange to 1.45 EUROS.  Now assume that by the time of expiration of 
the contract the spot rate for USD/EURO is 1.6 EUROS.  The buyer of the option in this 
scenario is protected from the higher spot rate because he has a contract guaranteeing an 
exchange rate of 1.40 EUROS.  If on the other hand, the spot rate were to drop to 1.25 
EUROS, it would not make sense for the option buyer to agree to pay 1.4 EUROS when 
the market rate was only 1.25 EUROS.  In this instance, assume the buyer allows the 
option to expire worthless and instead trades the currencies at the spot rate.  Though the 
spot rate is only 1.25 EUROS, the premium for the option must also be included which 
brings the effective exchange rate to 1.30 EUROS.  While the option buyer still realized a 
loss over the going spot rate, his downside potential is only .05 EUROS. 
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Real World 
 Corporations throughout the world use various currency derivatives as both a 
means to hedge against currency fluctuations and as a means for speculating in an effort 
to increase profits.  Many of these companies view their exact strategies as proprietary 
and are not inclined to disclose detailed information on each trade.  However, it is helpful 
to examine the overall results these companies realize when utilizing these derivatives. 
 One such company is Coca-Cola Enterprises, Inc.  According to the company’s 
2006 Annual Report, page 31, it earned $211MM as a result of currency fluctuations 
while it cost $28MM to transact these currency hedges for a net gain of $183MM.  In 
2005, the company lost $303MM on currency fluctuations which was offset by $54 MM 
gain from hedging for a net loss of $249MM.  Finally, in 2004, the company realized a 
gain of $305MM on its currency transactions while spending $28MM on hedging 
activities bringing the total gain from currencies to $277MM.  (CCE2006)  The company 
also stated on page 47 of the CCE2006 Annual Report that they use currency derivatives 
to limit the impact currency fluctuations has on its earnings. 
 “We, at times, use interest rate swap agreements and other financial instruments 
to manage the fluctuation of interest rates on our debt portfolio.  We also use currency 
swap agreements, forward agreements, options and other financial instruments to 
minimize the impact of currency exchange rate changes on our nonfunctional currency 
cash flows and to protect the value of our net investments in non-U.S. operations.  All 
derivative financial instruments are recorded at fair value on our Consolidated Balance 
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Sheets.  We do not use derivative financial instruments for trading or speculative 
purposes.”  (CCE2006)  While Coca-Cola Enterprise’s Annual report shows that the use 
of derivatives to hedge against currency fluctuations is not without cost or risk of loss, 
this company shows its belief on the stabilizing effects to its balance sheets that can be 
achieved through the use of these hedges. 
 Another company that employs currency hedging is Microsoft.  According to the 
Microsoft Corporation Annual Report 2007, page 20, the company realized a gain of 
$248MM in revenue growth over the previous year as a result of foreign currency 
exchange rates.  (MSFT 2007)  As part of its currency hedging strategy, Microsoft makes 
use of options contracts.  According to Microsoft Corporation Annual Report 2007, page 
32, “We are exposed to foreign currency, interest rate, fixed-income, equity, and 
commodity price risks. A portion of these risks is hedged, but fluctuations could impact 
our results of operations, financial position, and cash flows. We hedge a portion of 
anticipated revenue and accounts receivable exposure to foreign currency fluctuations, 
primarily with option contracts. We monitor our foreign currency exposures daily to 
maximize the overall effectiveness of our foreign currency hedge positions. Principal 
currencies hedged include the euro, Japanese yen, British pound, and Canadian dollar.” 
 While 2007 was a profitable year for Microsoft when it came to managing their 
currency risks, the years 2004 to 2006 were not as favorable.  According to Microsoft 
Corporation Annual Report 2006, page 32, the company had a net loss in 2004 of 
$284MM on its foreign currency contracts.  In 2005 they brought the loss down to 
$53MM and in 2006 the loss on foreign currency contracts was $313MM.  (MSFT 2006)  
The report attributes some of these loses due to “higher net losses in time value on 
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foreign exchange contracts used to hedge anticipated foreign currency revenues…” 
Despite these losses, however, it is not stated what the gains or losses would have been 
had hedging not been utilized. 
 This section has provided some background information on a few of the 
derivatives products available on the market today, while showing their perceived 
importance by some of the world’s largest organizations.  Next is an examination of the 
methodology used to study what would have been the results had the DOD implemented 
currency hedging in the FCFA as a way to mitigate loss. 
 
Studies and Legal Issues 
 One of the difficulties in researching this topic is the lack of previous work on this 
specific area.  Copious amounts of material have been postulated regarding hedging 
theory, risk analysis, and hedging in the corporate environment; however in the realm of 
non-profit organizations and the US Federal Government, little work is available.  
However, there is one 1998 study that was published in 2000 which addresses this very 
topic.  (Groshek and Felli 2000) 
 The authors, Gerald Groshek and James Felli, used a Monte Carlo simulation to 
test the results of hedging the Air Force Overseas Operations and Maintenance budget in 
the Japanese Yen, Great British Pound, and German Mark.  The hedging methods chosen 
by these authors included the use of forward and options contracts.  The data collected by 
the authors extended from 1985 to 1998.  According to the simulation, there would be an 
approximate six to seven percent savings using these hedging methods.  (Groshek and 
Felli 2000)  The authors conclude that it would be in the best interest of the DOD to 
19 
 
utilize hedging and seem to indicate a preference for the use of options as it provides an 
additional level of protection. 
 Even with the positive results of this simulation, the authors conclude that the 
implementation of a hedging strategy was not possible at the time due to limitations in 
DOD regulations.  However, according to Department of Defense Financial Management 
Regulation, Volume 5, Chapter 12, page 9, “Foreign currency is not purchased by 
forward contracts directly from foreign governments, private firms or individuals at a 
negotiated rate without prior authorization from the U.S. Treasury.  All requests for 
authorization must be submitted through the Financial Services and Disbursing 
Division.”  (DOD7000.14-R) The very next sub-point mentions, “Speculation in foreign 
currency is prohibited.” 
 What is interesting to note is that this stipulation only references forward 
contracts, not futures or options contracts.  Whether this is simply a technical loophole is 
a matter for debate.  Even should futures and options contracts be interpreted to fall along 
the same guidelines as a forward contract, the regulation does clearly state that contracts 
(specifically forwards) such as these are allowed, provided prior approval was obtained 
from the US Treasury.  The next prohibition against speculation in foreign currency is 
also arguably debatable.  The definition of what constitutes “speculation” is not provided.  
What is clear from the regulation is that engaging in currency hedging is not strictly 
prohibited, and as such could very well be a viable option for the DOD. 
 It is this author’s opinion that the conclusion of this study shows that currency 
hedging can be a prudent measure to protect DOD’s financial assets.  As such, a 
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clarification in DOD7000.14-R needs to be made to specifically allow the considered use 
of hedging.  
  
III. Methodology 
Measures 
 The data for the currency fluctuation portion of the DOD budget was obtained 
from the monthly Currency Fluctuation Reports produced by the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense, Comptroller at http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/fcfrprior.html.  The 
data collected is the monthly currency fluctuation reports from the beginning of fiscal 
year 2001, ending with fiscal year 2007.  The data shows the DOD projected and 
budgeted currency rates and the actual currency rates for nine different currencies in 
which the DOD conducts transactions.  It is assumed that the data provided in these 
official government reports are accurate. 
 Data for the cost of trading the underlying financial derivatives (EURO and YEN 
futures and options) were obtained from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange for the same 
time period.  It is also assumed that this data is accurate. 
 Of all the currencies in which the DOD executes transactions, the two currencies 
examined in this analysis are the EURO and the YEN.  The single largest currency 
expenditure in the DOD is the EURO. (SEPT_1506)  The reason for the selection of the 
YEN is that it is also heavily utilized by the DOD and should help to provide a balance to 
the analysis by including another region of the world.  Other currencies in which the 
DOD trades were not included for sake of simplicity and the fact that there are not 
sufficient market resources (in some cases) to hedge each of these individual currencies 
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to the same extent as the EURO and the YEN.  However, new currency trading pairs are 
being developed continuously and should the US express an interest in developing a 
futures/options market for specific currency, it should not be very difficult.   
 The data for the total expenditures in the EURO and the YEN were taken from the 
Foreign Currency Fluctuations, Defense Report, DDCOMP_1506, for Operations and 
Maintenance, Military Construction, Overseas Family Housing Operations and 
Maintenance, and Overseas Family Housing Construction.  While these four categories 
do not necessarily represent every USD spent by the DOD overseas, they do capture a 
large percentage of the budgeted expenditures in both the EURO and the YEN.  In 
examining the FY 2007 budget, the total expenditures in these four categories totaled 
$7,574,647,000 of which the EURO and YEN constitute 71.3 percent of this total.  
According to the National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2007, also known as the 
Greenbook, the total DOD budget for that year was $463,025,000,000.  Of the $463B 
spent that year, the EURO and YEN expenditures, as measured by this study, 
compromise 1.167 percent of the total DOD budget. 
 The derivatives chosen for this analysis are futures and options contracts.  Other 
methodologies such as swaps and forward contracts, while possibly viable alternatives, 
are not within the scope of this analysis.  For the options, call contracts were chosen 
rather than put contracts.  Because the DOD is a federal agency and a not-for-profit 
organization, call options were chosen as a way to hedge against a decline in the USD; 
any profit from the trade could be viewed as happenstance.  On the other hand, 
purchasing puts on the USD could be viewed by some as a way to profit on the 
22 
 
appreciation of the USD rather than as a hedge against its decline, and as such might not 
be looked upon favorably by the taxpaying community. 
In reality a put and a call can be thought of as mirror images of each other, 
depending on the position (long or short) on the trade.  Call options were chosen as a 
hedge against the declining value of the USD.  In an environment in which the USD 
increases in value relative to another currency, going long a put option might make more 
sense from a profitability standpoint.  However, either puts or calls could have been used 
to achieve similar results depending whether the buyer was long or short the trade.  A 
person could buy a call option on the USD/EURO or reverse the trade and purchase a put 
on the EURO/USD to likely achieve similar results.  Both calls and puts have their uses 
and either could have been chosen for this study.  It is the author’s opinion that call 
contracts might appear to be less of a “speculative” hedge in the eyes of the public and it 
was for this reason call contracts were chosen.  
 The actual trading costs for both the futures and derivatives have not been 
included for sake of simplicity.  As an example, to cover $4B USD/EURO contract 
would cost approximately USD $2,300 for the entire trade, according to the CME.  The 
dealer realizes a profit on the spread between the Bid and Ask price, not on the actual 
transaction costs. 
 The first trading day of October (typically October 1) was chosen as the day in 
which these purchases would have been made.  The closing price on the underlying 
contract was chosen rather than the open, high, or low price of the day.  Contracts were 
chosen with expiration in December, March, June, and September to correspond with the 
quarters DOD uses in its fiscal year. 
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 While the budgeted and realized currency exchange rates are annotated on a 
monthly basis, many of the budgeted expenditures are recorded quarterly.  For this 
reason, the monthly budgeted exchange rates were combined to provide a simple 
averaged quarterly exchange rate; likewise, the same procedure was used to create an 
average realized exchange rate.  As an example, the actual exchange rates for October, 
November, and December, will be averaged together to provide the Q1 realized exchange 
rate. 
 One important note to mention is that the EURO is relatively new on the currency 
scene, compared to say the YEN, GBP or YUAN.  As the EURO is comprised of the 
former currencies of many of its member countries, it is typically considered 
representative of Europe.  However, not all Euro-member countries merged their 
currencies immediately upon the creation of the EURO.  The German Duetschemark is 
still included in the DOD’s 2001 and 2002 budget.  Expenditures in the DM were 
approximately USD $900MM.  This amount has not been included in the analysis, as the 
purpose is to analyze the results of hedging the EURO, not on hedging all European 
expenditures.  As more member countries began to include their currency into the EURO, 
the US total EURO expenditures (irrespective of currency fluctuation) had increased 
because of an increase in the number of countries who use the EURO. 
 This is a passive/automated hedging strategy.  It is as though the people who 
manage the Foreign Currency Fluctuation Account made no analysis concerning the 
relative valuation of the USD as compared to the EURO or YEN, or if it was in need of a 
hedge.  These people would simple initiate a 100 percent hedge (either with futures or 
options) to fully cover all expected USD expenditures in these two currencies.  No 
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analysis has been undertaken to determine whether the derivatives themselves are 
over/under valued.  It is an assumption that market arbitrage would eliminate or mitigate 
most, if not all of these inefficiencies.  This automated and passive strategy is designed to 
eliminate any concerns that the account will be used for speculative purposes. 
.  
Data Analysis 
 As this is an ex post facto experiment, the data will be analyzed to determine what 
would have been the results if the DOD had purchased futures contracts or options 
contracts on futures for the EURO and the YEN at the beginning of each fiscal year to 
hedge the difference between the budgeted exchange rate and the actual spot rate.  It is 
assumed that all hedging contracts were “purchased” at the beginning of each fiscal year 
and no contracts were left open past the end of the same fiscal year. 
 The net difference in these hedged trades will be compared on a quarterly basis to 
the non-hedged results over this seven-year period.  It is hoped that employing this 
method will reveal which of these strategies would have provided the greatest amount of 
budgetary certainty, with the least amount of loss due to currency fluctuation 
 To better analyze the effectiveness of hedging the DOD budget, testing will also 
be conducted to compare the results of hedging zero percent, 25 percent, 50 percent, 75 
percent and 100 percent of the budgeted expenditures.  These percentages have been 
chosen to determine whether or not it is in the best interest of the DOD to hedge none, 
some, or all of its risk to the foreign currency markets. 
 In addition, the DOD budget is not spent in equal quarterly installments; rather, it 
tends to be spent in more of an escalating manner throughout the fiscal year, according to 
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Mark Wagner from the Program and Budget Operations Directorate, Office of the 
Undersecretary of Defense, Comptroller.  (M. Wagner, personal communications, 
December 14, 2007) Due to limitations in resources an approximation of these 
percentages was developed.  The estimated percentage of the budgeted expenditures for 
these two currencies are 15 percent for Q1, 20 percent for Q2, 30 percent for Q3 and 35 
percent for Q4.  Based on conversations with those in the DOD finance community, these 
estimates are believed to be a fairly reasonable facsimile of the true percentage of 
quarterly expenditures.  (M. Wagner, personal communications, December 14, 2007) 
 Some of the difficulties in ex post facto experiments are the ability of the research 
to show causality or to create a direct hypothesis.  (Babbie 2004)  These difficulties tend 
to be true of experiments involving people or multitudes of variables.  The beauty of an 
ex post facto experiment involving numbers is that there are only as many variables as 
the experimenter wishes to introduce.  This experiment has hopefully avoided these 
problems.   
 It is possible that if the DOD had actually purchased several hundred million 
dollars of contracts on a specified date(s), that would have affected the actual market 
value of the underlying contract.  This will most likely be a threat to the forward contract 
market, due the lower amount of liquidity inherent in this market.  However the other 
markets, especially the futures and options market, trade more than 200 billion contracts 
each year and the purchase of a few hundred contracts is not likely to have as great an 
impact.  (CME 2006) 
 While this analysis attempts to hedge the DOD’s projected exchange rate, 
establishing a perfect hedge was not be possible.  In all instances, the derivative products 
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available did not have a strike price that matched the exact budgeted exchange rate.  In 
such cases, the derivative with the closest match was used.  We still view an imperfect 
hedge as better than the alternative of a non-hedged position. 
  
 
Results and Analysis 
 
After running the analysis two things quickly become obvious – this passive hedging 
strategy would have worked well for the EURO while not as well for the YEN.  The 
results of using futures contracts are highlighted in Table 3.  The DOD realized a non-
hedged average annual loss of $665,782,780 from 2001 to 2007 on the EURO.  While 
still realizing an overall loss compared to budgeted exchange rates, DOD could in fact 
have saved an average of $171MM on the EURO, had hedges using futures contracts 
been utilized.  Given the fact that the DOD was still trading the DM in 2001 and 2002 
instead of solely the EURO, the potential savings could have been higher.  By eliminating 
the data from 2001 and 2002, the average annual savings for expenditures in the EURO 
would have been $208MM using options and $230MM using futures contracts. 
Using futures to hedge the budgeted exchange rate for the YEN actually resulted in a 
greater loss.  The average annual non-hedged loss from 2001 to 2007 on the YEN was 
$615,289.  By using futures to hedge the expected budgeted exchange rates, this loss 
would have been increased by an additional $275,927. 
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While these results are comparing either no hedge or a 100 percent hedge, the results 
are proportionately similar when comparing the fractional hedging at 25, 50 and 75 
percentages. 
 Table 1. 
Annual Results of Hedging with Futures 
 
Annual EURO Results Using Futures    
Hedging % 0% 25% 50% 75% 100% 
2001 -52,049,922 -51,910,755 -51,771,588 -51,632,420 -51,493,253
2002 -300,566,788 -289,581,625 -278,596,462 -267,611,300 -256,626,137
2003 -822,374,338 -730,748,663 -639,122,988 -547,497,313 -455,871,638
2004 -922,907,784 -871,120,680 -819,333,576 -767,546,473 -715,759,369
2005 1,154,843,013 1,135,012,695 1,115,182,378 1,095,352,060 1,075,521,743
2006 -523,419,928 -476,295,134 -429,170,339 -382,045,544 -334,920,750
2007 -884,317,690 -806,086,570 -727,855,451 -649,624,332 -571,393,212
Total Average -665,782,780 -622,965,160 -580,147,540 -537,329,920 -494,512,300
Average 
Savings 0 42,817,620 85,635,240 128,452,860 171,270,480
 
      
Annual YEN Results Using 
Futures     
Hedging % 0% 25% 50% 75% 100% 
2001 -211,245 -584,068 -956,891 -1,329,713 -1,702,536
2002 -486,032 -585,787 -685,542 -785,298 -885,053
2003 -1,304,585 -1,241,718 -1,178,851 -1,115,983 -1,053,116
2004 -1,595,062 -1,573,551 -1,552,040 -1,530,528 -1,509,017
2005 -948,820 -936,016 -923,213 -910,410 -897,607
2006 56,557 -11,064 -78,686 -146,307 -213,928
2007 182,166 142,312 102,457 62,603 22,748
Total Average -615,289 -684,270 -753,252 -822,234 -891,216
Average 
Savings 0 -68,982 -137,964 -206,945 -275,927  
    
 
 The results of hedging the DOD budget using options contract were similar to the 
results as with futures contracts – namely, savings would have been realized on the 
EURO and losses would have been compounded in the YEN.  However, by using 
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options, the outside range of savings and losses are a bit more subdued, as can be seen in 
Table 1.  Whereas futures contracts were held until expiration, options contracts give the 
holder the right to exercise the contract at the agreed upon rate or to simply let them 
expire and trade the currency at the prevailing market rate.  For this analysis, both 
possibilities were considered and whichever proved to be the most advantageous to DOD 
was chosen.  If the contract was allowed to expire unexercised, the cost of the hedge was 
added to the going spot rate as the total cost of the trade.  In most cases, it was more 
beneficial for DOD to exercise the option. 
 In the EURO, the resulting savings from fiscal year 2001 to 2007 using a 100 
percent hedge would have been an average of $161MM per annum more than the non-
hedged strategy.  This is approximately $10MM per annum less savings than would have 
been realized using the futures contracts for the EURO.  For the YEN during the same 
time period, the loss using a 100 percent hedge would have been an average of $180,021 
per year above the non-hedged strategy.  This is almost a $100K savings when compared 
to using futures contracts; but is a loss, nonetheless.  Again, while these results compare 
either no hedge or a 100 percent hedge, the results are proportionately similar when 
comparing the fractional hedging at 25, 50 and 75 percentages. 
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Table 2 
Annual Results of Hedging with Options 
Annual EURO Results Using Options    
Hedging % 0% 25% 50% 75% 100% 
2001 -52,049,921 -53,925,659 -55,801,398 -57,677,136 -59,552,874
2002 -300,566,794 -277,993,843 -255,420,892 -232,847,940 -210,274,989
2003 -822,374,335 -748,076,979 -673,779,622 -599,482,266 -525,184,909
2004 -922,907,736 -884,999,485 -847,091,234 -809,182,982 -771,274,731
2005 1,154,843,020 1,148,225,822 1,141,608,625 -1,134,991,427 1,128,374,229
2006 -523,419,931 -431,374,577 -339,329,222 -247,283,868 -155,238,513
2007 -884,317,688 -834,849,174 -785,380,659 -735,912,145 -686,443,630
Total Average -665,782,775 -625,635,077 -585,487,379 -545,339,680 -505,191,982
Average 
Savings 0 40,147,698 80,295,396 120,443,095 160,590,793
 
     
 
Annual YEN Results Using Options    
Hedging % 0% 25% 50% 75% 100% 
2001 -211,244 -349,473 -487,702 -625,930 -764,159
2002 -486,033 -605,835 -725,637 -845,438 -965,240
2003 -1,304,584 -1,300,601 -1,296,618 -1,292,634 -1,288,651
2004 -1,595,062 -1,597,007 -1,598,953 -1,600,898 -1,602,843
2005 -948,819 -948,464 -948,110 -947,755 -947,400
2006 56,557 16,244 -24,069 -64,381 -104,694
2007 182,167 163,081 143,995 124,909 105,823
Total Average -615,288 -660,294 -705,299 -750,304 -795,309
Average 
Savings 0 -45,005 -90,010 -135,016 -180,021
 
 
 Table 2 shows the results of options hedging for both the EURO and the YEN on 
an annual basis for fiscal years 2001 to 2007.  
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V.  Discussion 
 
In examining the results of this study, it is clearly obvious that given the budgeted 
exchange rate and currency fluctuations realized during fiscal years 2001 – 2007, the 
DOD would have realized a great deal of savings by choosing either hedging option 
(futures or options contracts) for the EURO.  What is surprising is the increase of loss by 
using the same methodology when applied to the YEN.  As many mutual fund 
perspectives say, past results are not a guarantee of future returns.  This statement is just 
as true for this study.  In the future, there could be some disruptive force, which could 
cause wild currency fluctuations in the EURO or provide a calming affect on the YEN. 
A quick examination of Figure 2 shows the extreme fluctuations in the YEN, both 
up and down, and could be a partial explanation of why the particular hedging method 
used by this study did not have more favorable results.  A simple hedge is more effective, 
as evidenced by the results on the EURO, when there is a general trend on the exchange 
rates.  However, when rates fluctuate as severely as the YEN has, other strategies 
specifically designed for such environments can be more effective.  In the world of 
options, such volatility is typically hedged with spreads, straddles, collars, etc. 
While this study shows a greater savings using futures contracts on the EURO, for 
future implementation, options should also be considered.  Because the option contract 
gives the option holder the right, but not the obligation to exercise the option, a greater 
level of protection is provided to the option holder against wild swings in the currency 
exchange rates, especially should some country decide to use a “financial nuclear option” 
against the USD. 
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One item that is important to note in this analysis is that when hedging using 
either futures or options, in no case was a 100 percent perfect hedge found that matched 
the budgeted exchange rate.  As mentioned earlier, the closest strike price to the budgeted 
exchange rate was chosen; however there was not one instance in which a perfect match 
was found.  It is unlikely that given the DOD’s current method of estimating future 
exchange rates, that an exact exchange rate match will be found.  This issue speaks more 
to the challenges of using a three-year weighted moving average of currency exchange 
rates than it does to the efficiency of the derivatives market.  For example, in the FY 
2007 budget, exchange rates from 2002, 2003, and 2004 were utilized when the planning 
for the FY 2007 budget began in 2005.  While this method of estimating future exchange 
rates may work better on relatively stable currency pairs, it is less effective otherwise.  
Despite these shortcomings, the data clearly indicates that a passive hedging strategy on 
the EURO would have produced positive results. 
The world currency markets trade trillions of USD annually, and much of this is 
done through the use of derivatives.  Large multi-national corporations make use of these 
derivatives as a way to hedge negative exposure to certain currencies.  If simply 
comparing total gross annual budgets, the US Department of Defense would likely be one 
of the largest global organizations; however it has yet to make use of derivatives to hedge 
its currency risks.  As such, these risks are absorbed by the DOD rather than by the 
marketplace.  These risks and losses are then passed along either to other areas of the 
defense budget or to the taxpayers directly. 
The DOD places great importance on risk analysis and risk mitigation in the 
employment of its forces and material resources.  Is it not reasonable that it should do the 
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same to its financial resources?  By utilizing commercially available derivative products, 
the DOD can, as the results of this study conclude, take reasonable steps to protect its 
currency transactions from fluctuations and devaluation in the USD.   
The method proposed by this study was a passive and automated hedging strategy 
on just two currency pairs, the USD/YEN and the USD/EURO.  Further opportunities 
could exist in other currencies in which the DOD trades.  However, the issues at hand 
with other currency pairs are a potential lack of market for derivative products and/or the 
possibility of the DOD actually moving the market when trading other currencies.  It is 
for this reason the possibility of using derivative hedges on a “basket” of currencies 
might actually prove a more effective way to hedge against other currencies in which the 
DOD trades.  Further research is required in this area. 
Further study can also be done to compare the results of an actively managed 
hedging portfolio vs. a passive portfolio.  Such a study could also examine various 
hedging strategies that extend beyond purchasing a futures contract or a call option.  
Shorts (puts), spreads, straddles, forwards, swaps or some other hybrid variation are other 
possibilities that should be examined in an effort to determine the optimum hedging 
strategy for the DOD.  Another factor, which would provide for an interesting study, is 
the use of derivatives that extend past the end of the fiscal year.  This study was limited 
in scope to a contract that could be entered at the beginning of the FY and concluded 
before the end of the FY.  It would be interesting to see the results of a longer-term 
approach or an approach that allowed an actively (or even passively) managed account to 
transcend between fiscal years.   
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In examining these results, it seems clear the DOD is missing an opportunity to 
transfer its currency risks from the American taxpayer to the commercial markets, but 
there are solutions.  One alternative might be to create an office within the DOD whose 
responsibilities were to make appropriate currency hedges for the DOD budget.  The 
difficulty with this approach is that it takes time to develop these positions and acquire 
the skilled personnel needed.  For this reason, hiring an outside firm to conduct hedging 
activities (within guidelines established by the DOD) could prove more efficient.  This 
approach is similar to how the DOD develops weapon systems, namely from deals 
worked out in the commercial sector based on strict guidelines.  The advantage to this 
second approach is that companies exist whose sole purpose is to provide such services 
for their clients.  Hypothetically, even if such a firm charged a minimal fixed fee and 
retained 10 percent of the savings, the potential savings for the DOD could still be well 
worth the undertaking. 
However, before undertaking any hedging strategy, some clarity regarding the 
permissibility of hedging needs to happen.  As mentioned earlier, DOD7000.14-R states 
that forward contracts can be used, but a waiver from the Treasury Department must be 
obtained.  This regulation also states that speculation in foreign currency is prohibited.  
Futures and options contracts are not forward contracts, but the principal behind using 
them could be construed by some as being the same.  It is for this reason, the regulation 
should be re-written to specifically allow the use of derivatives for hedging purposes. 
Once clarity has been achieved regarding currency hedging, the DOD needs to 
establish its criteria for such transactions.  In other words, should a passive or active 
strategy be developed?  It is this author’s believe that a passive strategy would be a better 
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fit for the DOD as a way to “purchase insurance” against unfavorable currency moves 
and would eliminate the misconstrued perception that the DOD was engaging in 
speculation with the American taxpayer’s money.  For these reasons, it would appear that 
hedging using futures would provide the most satisfactory results; however it should also 
be mentioned that other strategies do exist and future study may indicate a better 
alternative. 
Once clarification of DOD7000.14-R has been achieved, implementations of 
these hedging activities need to be established.  Again, the two possible scenarios are the 
creations of governmental positions or to outsource these activities.  The difficulty with 
creating a position(s) within the DOD is that such positions do not currently exist and 
their creation could take some time.  The other issue is that by following a passive 
hedging strategy, in which trades are placed at the beginning of the fiscal year, there 
would not be full-time employment available.  However, by outsourcing, the DOD would 
avoid these problems and could implement a hedging strategy much more quickly.  The 
expertise is already in place in the private sector and the costs vs. the savings could make 
for such outsourcing very beneficial. 
The goal of this paper was not to find the optimum hedging strategy, but rather to 
provide the seminal research for the concept and evidence that DOD could save money 
by employing a simple hedging strategy.  It is this author’s hope that this effort will 
provide the impetus for positive change within the DOD community and offer a way for 
the DOD to protect one of its key resources – its finances. 
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Appendix A 
Quarterly Results of Futures Hedging the Euro and Yen 2001 - 2007 
Total Spent 01 EURO 671,088,000   
  YEN 1,229,490,000   
 
Q1 @ 
15% Q2 @ 20% Q3 @ 30% Q4 @ 35% 
Annual 
Total 
EURO 7,713,821 -13,585,922 -10,029,222 -20,720,957 -52,049,922
YEN -147,932 -38,909 8,029 -32,432 -211,245
      
100% Hedged 
Q1 @ 
15% Q2 @ 20% Q3 @ 30% Q4 @ 35% 
Annual 
Total 
EURO 7,080,750 -9,924,184 -15,570,785 -18,917,535 -51,493,253
YEN -206,591 -310,618 -518,673 -666,654 -1,702,536
      
    Result if  
    Hedged  
    EURO 556,669
    YEN -1,491,291
 
Total Spent 02 EURO 1,964,781,000   
  YEN 919,201,000   
 Q1 @ 15% Q2 @ 20% Q3 @ 30% Q4 @ 35% 
Annual 
Total 
EURO 33,869,946 -33,508,187 -94,538,051 -138,650,603 -300,566,788
YEN -63,186 3,089 -155,915 -270,020 -486,032
      
100% 
Hedged Q1 @ 15% Q2 @ 20% Q3 @ 30% Q4 @ 35% 
Annual 
Total 
EURO 39,442,910 -51,726,043 -76,587,026 -88,870,159 -256,626,137
YEN -119,363 -168,526 -266,853 -330,310 -885,053
      
    Result if  
    Hedged  
    EURO 43,940,650
    YEN -399,021
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Total Spent 03 EURO 2,749,981,000   
  YEN 1,264,306,000   
 Q1 @ 15% Q2 @ 20% Q3 @ 30% Q4 @ 35% 
Annual 
Total 
EURO 74,721,164 -153,446,281 -282,661,142 -311,545,751 -822,374,338
YEN -122,031 -262,630 -378,369 -541,555 -1,304,585
      
100% 
Hedged Q1 @ 15% Q2 @ 20% Q3 @ 30% Q4 @ 35% 
Annual 
Total 
EURO 62,385,409 -94,458,217 -139,212,343 -159,815,668 -455,871,638
YEN -111,278 -212,075 -329,870 -399,894 -1,053,116
      
    Result if  
    Hedged  
    EURO 366,502,700
    YEN 251,468
 
Total Spent 04 EURO 3,680,203,000   
  YEN 1,324,280,000   
 Q1 @ 15% Q2 @ 20% Q3 @ 30% Q4 @ 35% 
Annual 
Total 
EURO 130,018,002 -200,861,481 -267,844,217 -324,184,083 -922,907,784
YEN -240,118 -380,333 -459,896 -514,715 -1,595,062
      
100% 
Hedged Q1 @ 15% Q2 @ 20% Q3 @ 30% Q4 @ 35% 
Annual 
Total 
EURO 109,933,607 -144,590,833 -214,126,098 -247,108,831 -715,759,369
YEN -216,957 -295,897 -453,778 -542,385 -1,509,017
      
    Result if  
    Hedged  
    EURO 207,148,414
    YEN 86,045
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Total Spent 05 EURO 3,960,471,000   
  YEN 729,762,000   
 Q1 @ 15% Q2 @ 20% Q3 @ 30% Q4 @ 35% Annual Total 
EURO 209,348,180 -268,065,166 -324,236,988 -353,192,678 1,154,843,013
YEN -183,342 -225,613 -281,783 -258,082 -948,820
      
100% 
Hedged Q1 @ 15% Q2 @ 20% Q3 @ 30% Q4 @ 35% Annual Total 
EURO 161,019,345 -214,771,669 -322,632,760 -377,097,969 1,075,521,743
YEN -123,060 -171,523 -270,421 -332,604 -897,607
      
    Result if  
    Hedged  
    EURO 79,321,270
    YEN 51,212
 
Total Spent 06 EURO 4,817,541,000   
  YEN 692,213,000   
 Q1 @ 15% Q2 @ 20% Q3 @ 30% Q4 @ 35% 
Annual 
Total 
EURO 36,172,001 -64,479,992 -188,704,141 -234,063,794 -523,419,928
YEN 22,625 21,514 -17,091 29,509 56,557
      
100% 
Hedged Q1 @ 15% Q2 @ 20% Q3 @ 30% Q4 @ 35% 
Annual 
Total 
EURO 41,692,999 -61,179,013 -101,885,356 -130,163,382 -334,920,750
YEN -14,048 -30,914 -67,138 -101,828 -213,928
      
    Result if  
    Hedged  
    EURO 188,499,179
    YEN -270,486
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Total Spent 07 EURO 4,940,194,000   
  YEN 461,430,000   
 Q1 @ 15% Q2 @ 20% Q3 @ 30% Q4 @ 35% 
Annual 
Total 
EURO 98,603,308 -146,450,207 -269,536,836 -369,727,338 -884,317,690
YEN 21,461 38,453 82,287 39,966 182,166
      
100% 
Hedged Q1 @ 15% Q2 @ 20% Q3 @ 30% Q4 @ 35% 
Annual 
Total 
EURO 79,191,631 -110,825,447 -172,907,432 -208,468,702 -571,393,212
YEN 16,342 12,099 4,305 -9,997 22,748
      
    Result if  
    Hedged  
    EURO 312,924,477
    YEN -159,418
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Appendix B 
Quarterly Results of Hedging the EURO with Options 2001 - 2007 
Total Spent 
'01 $671,088,000     
Non-hedged      
 Q1 @ 15% Q2 @ 20% Q3 @ 30% Q4 @ 35% Total 
 -7,713,821 13,585,922 -10,029,222 -20,720,957 52,049,921
Exercise Opt.      
 -7,453,204 11,373,734 -17,422,988 -46,891,838 83,141,763
      
      
    Results if  
    Hedged 31,091,842
      
Don't Ex. Opt -12,787,246 21,115,529 -25,712,548 -23,304,646 82,919,969
      
Best Result -7,453,204 11,373,734 -17,422,988 -23,302,948 59,552,874
      
    Best Results  
    if Hedged -7,502,953
 
Total Spent '02 $1,964,781,000     
Non-
hedged         
 Q1 @ 15% Q2 @ 20% Q3 @ 30% Q4 @ 35% Total    
 33,869,947 33,508,189 94,538,053 -138,650,606 300,566,794    
Exercise 
Opt.         
 16,935,361 22,611,918 72,567,084 -98,160,626 210,274,989    
         
    Results if     
    Hedged 90,291,806    
         
Don't 
Ex. Opt 36,383,884 36,891,541 97,001,888 -141,270,641 311,547,955    
         
Best 
Result 16,935,361 22,611,918 72,567,084 -98,160,626 210,274,989    
         
    Best Results     
    if Hedged 90,291,805    
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Total Spent '03 $2,749,981,000     
Non-
hedged        
 Q1 @ 15% Q2 @ 20% Q3 @ 30% Q4 @ 35% Total   
 -74,721,165 153,446,283 282,661,139 -311,545,748 822,374,335   
Exercise 
Opt.        
 -62,385,409 -95,118,213 160,414,697 -207,266,590 525,184,909   
        
    Results if    
    Hedged 297,189,426   
        
Don't 
Ex. Opt 128,964,540 208,005,906 316,238,407 -341,960,537 995,169,391   
        
Best 
Result -62,385,409 -95,118,213 160,414,697 -207,266,590 525,184,909   
        
    Best Results    
    if Hedged 297,189,426   
 
Total Spent 
'04 3,680,203,000     
Non-hedged      
 Q1 @ 15% Q2 @ 20% Q3 @ 30% Q4 @ 35% Total 
 -130,018,004 -200,861,439 267,844,214 324,184,079 -922,907,736
Exercise Opt.      
 -109,933,607 -144,590,833 224,945,894 291,804,897 -771,275,232
      
    Results if  
    Hedged 151,632,504
      
Don't Ex. Opt -234,186,150 -337,764,990 381,893,705 409,325,575 1,363,170,421
      
Best Result -109,933,607 -144,590,333 224,945,894 291,804,897 -771,274,731
      
    
Best 
Results  
    if Hedged 151,633,005
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Total Spent '05 $3,960,471,000       
Non-
hedged          
 Q1 @ 15% Q2 @ 20% Q3 @ 30% Q4 @ 35%  Total    
 209,348,180 268,065,169 324,236,988 -353,192,683  1,154,843,020    
Exercise 
Opt.          
 161,019,345 214,771,669 323,226,831 -429,356,384  1,128,374,228    
          
    Results if      
    Hedged  26,468,792    
          
Don't 
Ex. Opt 316,637,340 403,275,649 516,240,622 -435,392,259  1,671,545,869    
          
Best 
Result 161,019,345 214,771,669 323,226,831 -429,356,384  1,128,374,229    
          
    Best Results      
    if Hedged  26,468,791    
 
Total Spent 
'06 $4,817,541,000     
Non-hedged      
 Q1 @ 15% Q2 @ 20% Q3 @ 30% Q4 @ 35% Total 
 -36,172,003 64,479,992 188,704,141 234,063,794 523,419,931
Exercise Opt.      
 1,108,444 -8,224,602 12,695,040 160,817,395 155,238,514
      
    Results if  
    Hedged 368,181,416
      
Don't Ex. Opt -41,064,216 71,070,388 202,463,038 240,268,787 554,866,429
      
Best Result 1,108,444 -8,224,602 12,695,040 160,817,395 155,238,513
      
    
Best 
Results  
    if Hedged 368,181,418
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Total Spent 
'07 $4,940,194,000     
Non-hedged      
 Q1 @ 15% Q2 @ 20% Q3 @ 30% Q4 @ 35% Total 
 -98,603,311 -146,450,203 -269,536,841 -369,727,333 -884,317,688
Exercise Opt.      
 -80,821,895 -129,400,576 -207,735,800 -268,467,359 -686,425,630
      
    Difference if  
    Hedged 197,892,058
      
Don't Ex. Opt -129,281,915 -174,411,702 -325,114,024 -434,740,286 1,063,547,926
      
Best Result -80,821,895 -129,400,576 -207,753,800 -268,467,359 -686,443,630
      
    Best Results  
    if Hedged 197,874,058
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Appendix C 
Quarterly Results of Hedging the YEN with Options FY 2001 - 2007 
Total Spent '01 $1,229,490,000    
Non-hedged        
 Q1 @ 15% Q2 @ 20% Q3 @ 30% Q4 @ 35% Total   
 147,932 -38,908 8,030 -32,433 -211,244   
Exercise Opt.        
 206,776 323,897 578,795 -919,683 2,029,150   
    Results if    
    Hedged 1,817,907   
        
Don't Ex. Opt 297,130 187,677 197,418 -172,288 -854,513   
        
Best Result 206,776 187,677 197,418 -172,288 -764,159   
        
    
Best 
Results    
    if Hedged -552,915   
 
Total Spent '02 $919,201,000     
Non-hedged        
 Q1 @ 15% Q2 @ 20% Q3 @ 30% Q4 @ 35% Total   
 -63,186 3,089 155,915 270,020 -486,033   
Exercise Opt.    
 124,327 170,181 274,850 405,915 -975,272   
    Results if    
    Hedged -489,240   
        
Don't Ex. Opt 118,063 166,412 402,169 417,368 1,104,011   
        
        
        
Best Result 118,063 166,412 274,850 405,915 -965,240   
         
    Best Results 
    
if 
Hedged -479,207     
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Total Spent '03 $1,264,306,000    
Non-hedged        
 Q1 @ 15% Q2 @ 20% Q3 @ 30% Q4 @ 35% Total   
 122,031 262,629 378,370 541,553 1,304,584   
Exercise Opt.        
 113,175 216,120 373,109 760,094 1,462,499   
    Results if    
    Hedged -157,915   
        
Don't Ex. Opt 235,819 449,241 555,499 586,247 1,826,806   
        
        
        
Best Result 113,175 216,120 373,109 586,247 1,288,651   
        
    Best Results 
    if Hedged 15,933   
 
Total Spent '04 $1,324,280,000     
Non-hedged       
 Q1 @ 15% Q2 @ 20% Q3 @ 30% Q4 @ 35% Total   
 240,118 380,333 459,896 -514,715 1,595,062   
Exercise Opt.        
 216,957 297,751 474,834 -613,301 1,602,842   
    Results if    
    Hedged -7,780   
        
Don't Ex. Opt 450,878 643,335 763,421 -789,105 2,646,739   
        
        
        
Best Result 216,957 297,751 474,834 -613,301 1,602,843   
        
    
Best 
Results    
    if Hedged -7,781   
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Total Spent '05 $729,762,000    
Non-hedged        
 Q1 @ 15% Q2 @ 20% Q3 @ 30% Q4 @ 35% Total   
 183,342 225,613 281,783 -258,081 -948,819   
Exercise Opt.        
 123,607 173,421 316,177 -416,125 1,029,329   
    Results if    
    Hedged -80,511   
        
Don't Ex. Opt 248,801 336,099 350,308 -334,195 1,269,403   
        
        
        
Best Result 123,607 173,421 316,177 -334,195 -947,400   
        
    
Best 
Results    
    if Hedged 1,419   
 
Total Spent –06 $692,213,000     
Non-hedged        
 Q1 @ 15% Q2 @ 20% Q3 @ 30% Q4 @ 35% Total   
 22,625 21,514 -17,091 29,509 56,557   
Exercise Opt.        
 20,901 43,236 -88,112 270,451 -422,700   
    Results if    
    Hedged -479,257   
        
Don't Ex. Opt 2,170 21,126 104,310 2,374 -120,892   
        
        
        
Best Result 2,170 21,126 -88,112 2,374 -104,694   
        
    Best Results 
    if Hedged -161,251   
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Total Spent '07  $461,430,000     
Non-hedged        
 Q1 @ 15% Q2 @ 20% Q3 @ 30% Q4 @ 35% Total   
 21,461 38,453 82,286 39,967 182,167   
Exercise Opt.        
 -616 -8,389 33,624 -51,664 -94,293   
    Results if    
    Hedged -276,460   
        
Don't Ex. Opt 19,039 27,655 58,892 237 105,823   
        
        
        
Best Result 19,039 27,655 58,892 237 105,823   
        
    
Best 
Results    
    if Hedged -76,344   
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Appendix D 
DOD EURO/YEN Currency Expenditures 2001 - 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EURO 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 
O&M 1,679,924,000 2,237,974,000 1,890,207,000 1,713,963,000 1,439,945,000 1,232,011,000 487,751,000 
MilCon 1,289,306,000 956,015,000 834,741,000 831,653,000 702,006,000 338,423,000 70,729,000 
Fam H. 
 O&M 1,728,416,000 1,460,354,000 1,108,010,000 906,050,000 473,975,000 304,827,000 41,808,000 
Fam H. 
Const. 242,548,000 163,198,000 127,513,000 228,537,000 134,055,000 89,520,000 70,800,000 
        
Total 4,940,194,000 4,817,541,000 3,960,471,000 3,680,203,000 2,749,981,000 1,964,781,000 671,088,000 
        
YEN 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 
O&M 147,179,000 387,871,000 409,569,000 442,347,000 566,316,000 361,310,000 281,424,000 
MilCon 273,923,000 256,638,000 278,223,000 406,740,000 324,139,000 277,959,000 260,519,000 
Fam H. 
 O&M 37,615,000 41,656,000 39,871,000 438,046,000 351,657,000 263,553,000 672,063,000 
Fam H. 
Const. 2,713,000 6,048,000 2,099,000 37,147,000 22,194,000 16,379,000 15,484,000 
        
Total 461,430,000 692,213,000 729,762,000 1,324,280,000 1,264,306,000 919,201,000 1,229,490,000  
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Appendix E 
DOD Budgeted and Actual Exchange Rates with Quarterly Averages 2001-2007 
Budgeted   Actual Expenditures   
FY 
2001 Currency USD to FC FC to USD 
Adjusting Rate in 
USD 
Adjusting Rate in 
FC 
      
Oct Euro 0.811359 1.2325 0.849329 1.1774
 Yen 0.0081878 122.1325 0.0091667 109.09
Nov Euro 0.811359 1.2325 0.8722198 1.1465
 Yen 0.0081878 122.1325 0.009058 110.4
Dec Euro 0.811359 1.2325 0.9424182 1.0611
 Yen 0.0081878 122.1325 0.0087451 114.35
Jan Euro 0.811359 1.2325 0.9365927 1.0677
 Yen 0.0081878 122.1325 0.0085933 116.37
Feb Euro 0.811359 1.2325 0.9231905 1.0832
 Yen 0.0081878 122.1325 0.0085215 117.35
Mar Euro 0.811359 1.2325 0.8779631 1.139
 Yen 0.0081878 122.1325 0.0079233 126.21
April Euro 0.811359 1.2325 0.8872327 1.1271
 Yen 0.0081878 122.1325 0.008088 123.64
May Euro 0.811359 1.2325 0.8460237 1.182
 Yen 0.0081878 122.1325 0.0083921 119.16
June Euro 0.811359 1.2325 0.8502678 1.1761
 Yen 0.0081878 122.1325 0.008018 124.72
July Euro 0.811359 1.2325 0.8755801 1.1421
 Yen 0.0081878 122.1325 0.0079968 125.05
Aug Euro 0.811359 1.2325 0.9116601 1.0969
 Yen 0.0081878 122.1325 0.0084203 118.76
Sep Euro 0.811359 1.2325 0.9114939 1.0971
 Yen 0.0081878 122.1325 0.0083724 119.44
 
 Quarterly Averages Budgeted Rate Realized Quarterly Average Rate Difference 
         
Q1 0.811359 EURO  Q1 0.887989 EURO Q1 -0.07663000
 0.0081878 YEN  0.00898993 YEN  -0.00080213
Q2 0.811359 EURO  Q2 0.9125821 EURO Q2 -0.10122310
 0.0081878 YEN   0.00834603 YEN  -0.00015823
Q3 0.811359 EURO  Q3 0.86117473 EURO Q3 -0.04981573
 0.0081878 YEN  0.00816603 YEN  0.00002177
Q4 0.811359 EURO  Q4 0.89957803 EURO Q4 -0.08821903
 0.0081878 YEN   0.00826317 YEN  -0.00007537
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FY 
2002      
 Currency USD to FC FC to USD 
Adjusting Rate in 
USD 
Adjusting Rate in 
FC 
Oct Euro 0.7810669 1.2803 0.899928 1.1112
 Yen 0.0074963 133.4 0.0081679 122.43
Nov Euro 0.7810669 1.2803 0.8965394 1.1154
 Yen 0.0074963 133.4 0.0081011 123.44
Dec Euro 0.7810669 1.2803 0.891504 1.1217
 Yen 0.0074963 133.4 0.0075947 131.67
Jan Euro 0.7810669 1.2803 0.8583691 1.165
 Yen 0.0074963 133.4 0.007425 134.68
Feb Euro 0.7810669 1.2803 0.8690362 1.1507
 Yen 0.0074963 133.4 0.0074817 133.66
Mar Euro 0.7810669 1.2803 0.8716116 1.1473
 Yen 0.0074963 133.4 0.0075318 132.77
April Euro 0.7810669 1.2803 0.9004142 1.1106
 Yen 0.0074963 133.4 0.0077767 128.59
May Euro 0.7810669 1.2803 0.9325748 1.0723
 Yen 0.0074963 133.4 0.0080451 124.3
June Euro 0.7810669 1.2803 0.991375 1.0087
 Yen 0.0074963 133.4 0.0083633 119.57
July Euro 0.7810669 1.2803 0.9775171 1.023
 Yen 0.0074963 133.4 0.0083459 119.82
Aug Euro 0.7810669 1.2803 0.9828976 1.0174
 Yen 0.0074963 133.4 0.0084467 118.39
Sep Euro 0.7810669 1.2803 0.9876543 1.0125
 Yen 0.0074963 133.4 0.0082142 121.74
 
 Quarterly Averages Budgeted Rate Realized Quarterly Average Rate Difference 
         
Q1 0.7810669 EURO  Q1 0.89599047 EURO Q1 -0.11492357
 0.0074963 YEN  0.00795457 YEN  -0.00045827
Q2 0.7810669 EURO  Q2 0.86633897 EURO Q2 -0.08527207
 0.0074963 YEN   0.0074795 YEN  0.00001680
Q3 0.7810669 EURO  Q3 0.94145467 EURO Q3 -0.16038777
 0.0074963 YEN  0.0080617 YEN  -0.00056540
Q4 0.7810669 EURO  Q4 0.98268967 EURO Q4 -0.20162277
 0.0074963 YEN   0.0083356 YEN  -0.00083930
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FY 
2003 Currency USD to FC FC to USD 
Adjusting Rate in 
USD 
Adjusting Rate in 
FC 
      
Oct Euro 0.8782716 1.1386 0.989805 1.0103
 Yen 0.0080431 124.33 0.0081599 122.55
Nov Euro 0.8062566 1.2403 0.9944312 1.0056
 Yen 0.0073833 135.4401 0.0081599 122.55
Dec Euro 0.8062566 1.2403 1.049979 0.9524
 Yen 0.0073833 135.4401 0.0084203 118.76
Jan Euro 0.8062566 1.2403 1.0765421 0.9289
 Yen 0.0073833 135.4401 0.008341 119.89
Feb Euro 0.8062566 1.2403 1.0800302 0.9259
 Yen 0.0073833 135.4401 0.008466 118.12
Mar Euro 0.8062566 1.2403 1.099183 0.9175
 Yen 0.0073833 135.4401 0.0084588 118.22
April Euro 0.8062566 1.2403 1.118068 0.8944
 Yen 0.0073833 135.4401 0.0084111 118.89
May Euro 0.8062566 1.2403 1.1770245 0.8496
 Yen 0.0073833 135.4401 0.0083787 119.35
June Euro 0.8062566 1.2403 1.1515431 0.8684
 Yen 0.0073833 135.4401 0.0083528 119.72
July Euro 0.8062566 1.2403 1.1243535 0.8894
 Yen 0.0073833 135.4401 0.0082932 120.58
Aug Euro 0.8062566 1.2403 1.0990219 0.9099
 Yen 0.0073833 135.4401 0.0085572 116.86
Sep Euro 0.8062566 1.2403 1.1664528 0.8573
 Yen 0.0073833 135.4401 0.008971 111.47
 
 Quarterly Averages Budgeted Rate Realized Quarterly Average Rate Difference 
         
Q1 0.8302616 EURO  Q1 1.01140507 EURO Q1 -0.18114347
 0.00760323 YEN  0.0082467 YEN  -0.00064347
Q2 0.8062566 EURO  Q2 1.08525177 EURO Q2 -0.27899517
 0.0073833 YEN   0.00842193 YEN  -0.00103863
Q3 0.8062566 EURO  Q3 1.14887853 EURO Q3 -0.34262193
 0.0073833 YEN  0.00838087 YEN  -0.00099757
Q4 0.8062566 EURO  Q4 1.12994273 EURO Q4 -0.32368613
 0.0073833 YEN   0.00860713 YEN  -0.00122383
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FY 
2004 Currency USD to FC FC to USD 
Adjusting Rate in 
USD 
Adjusting Rate in 
FC 
      
Oct Euro 0.9695559 1.0314 1.1583459 0.8633
 Yen 0.0079688 125.49 0.0090959 109.94
Nov Euro 0.9695559 1.0314 1.1990408 0.834
 Yen 0.0079688 125.49 0.0091233 109.61
Dec Euro 0.9695559 1.0314 1.2578616 0.795
 Yen 0.0079688 125.49 0.0093136 107.37
Jan Euro 0.9695559 1.0314 1.247505 0.8016
 Yen 0.0079688 125.49 0.0094554 105.76
Feb Euro 0.9695559 1.0314 1.2495314 0.8003
 Yen 0.0079688 125.49 0.0091768 108.97
Mar Euro 0.9695559 1.0314 1.230315 0.8128
 Yen 0.0079688 125.49 0.0095822 104.36
April Euro 0.9695559 1.0314 1.1980352 0.8347
 Yen 0.0079688 125.49 0.009049 110.51
May Euro 0.9695559 1.0314 1.218769 0.8205
 Yen 0.0079688 125.49 0.0091416 109.39
June Euro 0.9695559 1.0314 1.2196609 0.8199
 Yen 0.0079688 125.49 0.0091886 108.83
July Euro 0.9695559 1.0314 1.2023566 0.8317
 Yen 0.0079688 125.49 0.0089928 111.2
Aug Euro 0.9695559 1.0314 1.2177302 0.8212
 Yen 0.0079688 125.49 0.009155 109.23
Sep Euro 0.9695559 1.0314 1.2436264 0.8041
 Yen 0.0079688 125.49 0.0090901 110.01
 
 Quarterly Averages Budgeted Rate Realized Quarterly Average Rate Difference 
         
Q1 0.9695559 EURO  Q1 1.20508277 EURO Q1 -0.23552687
 0.0079688 YEN  0.0091776 YEN  -0.00120880
Q2 0.9695559 EURO  Q2 1.24245047 EURO Q2 -0.27289457
 0.0079688 YEN   0.0094048 YEN  -0.00143600
Q3 0.9695559 EURO  Q3 1.21215503 EURO Q3 -0.24259913
 0.0079688 YEN  0.0091264 YEN  -0.00115760
Q4 0.9695559 EURO  Q4 1.22123773 EURO Q4 -0.25168183
 0.0079688 YEN   0.0090793 YEN  -0.00111050
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FY 
2005 Currency USD to FC FC to USD 
Adjusting Rate in 
USD 
Adjusting Rate in 
FC 
      
Oct Euro 0.9695559 1.0314 1.2797543 0.7814
 Yen 0.0079688 125.49 0.0094482 105.84
Nov Euro 0.9695559 1.0314 1.3294337 0.7522
 Yen 0.0079688 125.49 0.0097182 102.9
Dec Euro 0.9695559 1.0314 1.356668 0.7371
 Yen 0.0079688 125.49 0.0097647 102.41
Jan Euro 0.9695559 1.0314 1.3034411 0.7672
 Yen 0.0079688 125.49 0.0096497 103.63
Feb Euro 0.9695559 1.0314 1.3243279 0.7551
 Yen 0.0079688 125.49 0.0095657 104.54
Mar Euro 0.9695559 1.0314 1.2961763 0.7715
 Yen 0.0079688 125.49 0.0093284 107.2
April Euro 0.9695559 1.0314 1.2866701 0.7772
 Yen 0.0079688 125.49 0.0095374 104.85
May Euro 0.9695559 1.0314 1.2304663 0.8127
 Yen 0.0079688 125.49 0.009214 108.53
June Euro 0.9695559 1.0314 1.2102142 0.8263
 Yen 0.0079688 125.49 0.0090163 110.91
July Euro 0.9695559 1.0314 1.2124151 0.8248
 Yen 0.0079688 125.49 0.0088952 112.42
Aug Euro 0.9695559 1.0314 1.2336541 0.8106
 Yen 0.0079688 125.49 0.0090351 110.68
Sep Euro 0.9695559 1.0314 1.2269939 0.815
 Yen 0.0079688 125.49 0.0090074 111.02
 
 Quarterly Averages Budgeted Rate Realized Quarterly Average Rate Difference 
         
Q1 0.9695559 EURO  Q1 1.321952 EURO Q1 -0.35239610
 0.0079688 YEN  0.0096437 YEN  -0.00167490
Q2 0.9695559 EURO  Q2 1.30798177 EURO Q2 -0.33842587
 0.0079688 YEN   0.0095146 YEN  -0.00154580
Q3 0.9695559 EURO  Q3 1.2424502 EURO Q3 -0.27289430
 0.0079688 YEN  0.0092559 YEN  -0.00128710
Q4 0.9695559 EURO  Q4 1.22435437 EURO Q4 -0.25479847
 0.0079688 YEN   0.00897923 YEN  -0.00101043
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FY 
2006 Currency USD to FC FC to USD 
Adjusting Rate in 
USD 
Adjusting Rate in 
FC 
      
Oct Euro 1.1383039 0.8785 1.198466 0.8344
 Yen 0.0086957 115 0.0085911 116.4
Nov Euro 1.1383039 0.8785 1.1791062 0.8481
 Yen 0.0086957 115 0.0083459 119.82
Dec Euro 1.1383039 0.8785 1.1875074 0.8421
 Yen 0.0086957 115 0.0084964 117.6967
Jan Euro 1.1383039 0.8785 1.2118274 0.8252
 Yen 0.0086957 115 0.0084955 117.71
Feb Euro 1.1383039 0.8785 1.1924636 0.8386
 Yen 0.0086957 115 0.0086341 115.82
Mar Euro 1.1383039 0.8785 1.211387 0.8255
 Yen 0.0086957 115 0.0084913 117.768
April Euro 1.1383039 0.8785 1.2537613 0.7976
 Yen 0.0086957 115 0.0087489 114.2999
May Euro 1.1383039 0.8785 1.2815584 0.7803
 Yen 0.0086957 115 0.0088857 112.54
June Euro 1.1383039 0.8785 1.2712942 0.7866
 Yen 0.0086957 115 0.0086994 114.9503
July Euro 1.1383039 0.8785 1.2774655 0.7828
 Yen 0.0086957 115 0.0087222 114.65
Aug Euro 1.1383039 0.8785 1.2851819 0.7781
 Yen 0.0086957 115 0.0085237 117.3205
Sep Euro 1.1383039 0.8785 1.2687135 0.7882
 Yen 0.0086957 115 0.0084758 117.983
 
 Quarterly Averages Budgeted Rate Realized Quarterly Average Rate Difference 
         
Q1 1.1383039 EURO  Q1 1.18835987 EURO Q1 -0.05005597
 0.0086957 YEN  0.0084778 YEN  0.00021790
Q2 1.1383039 EURO  Q2 1.205226 EURO Q2 -0.06692210
 0.0086957 YEN   0.0085403 YEN  0.00015540
Q3 1.1383039 EURO  Q3 1.2688713 EURO Q3 -0.13056740
 0.0086957 YEN  0.008778 YEN  -0.00008230
Q4 1.1383039 EURO  Q4 1.2771203 EURO Q4 -0.13881640
 0.0086957 YEN   0.0085739 YEN  0.00012180
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FY 
2007 Currency USD to FC FC to USD 
Adjusting Rate in 
USD 
Adjusting Rate in 
FC 
      
Oct Euro 1.1723329 0.853 1.2764871 0.7834
 Yen 0.0088261 113.3 0.0085551 116.8899
Nov Euro 1.1723329 0.853 1.3199996 0.7576
 Yen 0.0088261 113.3 0.0085911 116.4002
Dec Euro 1.1723329 0.853 1.3197 0.7577
 Yen 0.0088261 113.3 0.0084019 119.02
Jan Euro 1.1723329 0.853 1.3034411 0.7672
 Yen 0.0088261 113.3 0.0082871 120.67
Feb Euro 1.1723329 0.853 1.3227569 0.756
 Yen 0.0088261 113.3 0.0084515 118.3224
Mar Euro 1.1723329 0.853 1.3354701 0.7488
 Yen 0.0088261 113.3 0.0084897 117.79
April Euro 1.1723329 0.853 1.3635124 0.7334
 Yen 0.0088261 113.3 0.0083612 119.5998
May Euro 1.1723329 0.853 1.3449899 0.7435
 Yen 0.0088261 113.3 0.0082149 121.7307
June Euro 1.1723329 0.853 1.3540961 0.7385
 Yen 0.0088261 113.3 0.0081189 123.17
July Euro 1.1723329 0.853 1.3708019 0.7295
 Yen 0.0088261 113.3 0.0083925 119.1535
Aug Euro 1.1723329 0.853 1.3642006 0.733
 Yen 0.0088261 113.3 0.0086326 115.8402
Sep Euro 1.1723329 0.853 1.4234875 0.07025
 Yen 0.0088261 113.3 0.0087108 114.8
 
 Quarterly Averages Budgeted Rate Realized Quarterly Average Rate Difference 
         
Q1 1.1723329 EURO  Q1 1.30539557 EURO Q1 -0.13306267
 0.0088261 YEN  0.00851603 YEN  0.00031007
Q2 1.1723329 EURO  Q2 1.32055603 EURO Q2 -0.14822313
 0.0088261 YEN   0.00840943 YEN  0.00041667
Q3 1.1723329 EURO  Q3 1.35419947 EURO Q3 -0.18186657
 0.0088261 YEN  0.00823167 YEN  0.00059443
Q4 1.1723329 EURO  Q4 1.38616333 EURO Q4 -0.21383043
 0.0088261 YEN   0.00857863 YEN  0.00024747
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Appendix F 
EURO Futures Data 2001-2007 
EURO 
Trade 
Date 
Delivery 
Month 
Contract 
Year 
Settle 
Price 
100200 12 2000 0.8817
100200 3 2001 0.8853
100200 6 2001 0.8887
100200 9 2001 0.8919
 
Trade 
Date 
Delivery 
Month 
Contract 
Year 
Settle 
Price 
100101 12 2001 0.9149
100101 3 2002 0.9127
100101 6 2002 0.911
100101 9 2002 0.9103
 
Trade 
Date 
Delivery 
Month 
Contract 
Year 
Settle 
Price 
100102 12 2002 0.9815
100102 3 2003 0.978
100102 6 2003 0.975
100102 9 2003 0.9723
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Trade 
Date 
Delivery 
Month 
Contract 
Year 
Settle 
Price 
100103 12 2003 1.1687
100103 3 2004 1.166
100103 6 2004 1.1635
100103 9 2004 1.1614
 
Trade 
Date 
Delivery 
Month 
Contract 
Year 
Settle 
Price 
100104 12 2004 1.2406
100104 3 2005 1.2407
100104 6 2005 1.2411
100104 9 2005 1.2416
 
Trade 
Date 
Delivery 
Month 
Contract 
Year 
Settle 
Price 
100305 12 2005 1.196
100305 3 2006 1.2018
100305 6 2006 1.2088
100305 9 2006 1.2155
 
Trade 
Date 
Delivery 
Month 
Contract 
Year 
Settle 
Cabinet
Settle 
Price 
100206 12 2006  1.2792
100206 3 2007  1.2845
100206 6 2007  1.289
100206 9 2007  1.2929
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Appendix G 
YEN Futures Data 2001-2007 
YEN 
Trade 
Date 
Delivery 
Month 
Contract 
Year 
Settle 
Price 
100200 12 2000 0.009308
100200 3 2001 0.009451
100200 6 2001 0.009594
100200 9 2001 0.009737
 
Trade 
Date 
Delivery 
Month 
Contract 
Year 
Settle 
Price 
100101 12 2001 0.008362
100101 3 2002 0.008413
100101 6 2002 0.008464
100101 9 2002 0.008523
 
Trade 
Date 
Delivery 
Month 
Contract 
Year 
Settle 
Price 
100102 12 2002 0.00819
100102 3 2003 0.008222
100102 6 2003 0.008253
100102 9 2003 0.008287
 
 
 
58 
 
Trade 
Date 
Delivery 
Month 
Contract 
Year 
Settle 
Price 
100103 12 2003 0.009061
100103 3 2004 0.009086
100103 6 2004 0.009111
100103 9 2004 0.009139
 
Trade 
Date 
Delivery 
Month 
Contract 
Year 
Settle 
Price 
100104 12 2004 0.009093
100104 3 2005 0.009144
100104 6 2005 0.009204
100104 9 2005 0.009271
 
Trade 
Date 
Delivery 
Month 
Contract 
Year 
Settle 
Price 
100305 12 2005 0.008831
100305 3 2006 0.008919
100305 6 2006 0.009019
100305 9 2006 0.009116
 
Trade 
Date 
Delivery 
Month 
Contract 
Year 
Settle 
Price 
100206 12 2006 0.00859
100206 3 2007 0.008695
100206 6 2007 0.008795
100206 9 2007 0.008888
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Appendix H  
EURO Options Data 2001 - 2007 
EURO 
Trade Date 
Delivery 
Month 
Contract 
Year Strike Price Settle Price 
100200 12 2000 0.835 0.0504
100200 3 2001 0.84 0.0561
100200 6 2001 0.82 0.0779
100200 9 2001 1 0.011
 
Trade Date 
Delivery 
Month 
Contract 
Year Strike Price 
Settle 
Price 
100101 12 2001 0.83 0.00853
100101 3 2002 0.83 0.00861
100101 6 2002 0.9 0.00418
100101 9 2002 0.92 0.00381
 
Trade Date 
Delivery 
Month 
Contract 
Year Strike Price Settle Price 
100102 12 2002 0.85 0.1315
100102 3 2003 0.88 0.0992
100102 6 2003 0.96 0.0407
100102 9 2003 0.99 0.0316
 
Trade Date 
Delivery 
Month 
Contract 
Year Strike Price Settle Price
100103 12 2003 0.98 0.1887
100103 3 2004 0.98 0.186
100103 6 2004 1.07 0.1033
100103 9 2004 1.13 0.0661
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Trade Date 
Delivery 
Month 
Contract 
Year Strike Price Settle Price 
100104 12 2004 1.06 0.1806
100104 3 2005 1.07 0.1707
100104 6 2005 1.08 0.1616
100104 9 2005 1.22 0.0593
 
Trade Date 
Delivery 
Month 
Contract 
Year Strike Price Settle Price 
100305 12 2005 1.13 0.00677
100305 3 2006 1.14 0.00684
100305 6 2006 1.12 0.00952
100305 9 2006 1.23 0.00368
 
Trade Date 
Delivery 
Month 
Contract 
Year Strike Price Settle Price 
100206 12 2006 1.24 0.0414 
100206 3 2007 1.275 0.0283 
100206 6 2007 1.275 0.0375 
100206 9 2007 1.29 0.0376 
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Appendix I 
YEN Options Data 2001 - 2007 
YEN 
Trade Date 
Delivery 
Month 
Contract 
Year Strike Price Settle Price
100200 12 2000 0.0085 0.000809
100200 3 2001 0.0089 0.000605
100200 6 2001 0.0092 0.000557
100200 9 2001 0.01 0.000325
 
 
Trade Date 
Delivery 
Month 
Contract 
Year Strike Price 
Settle 
Price 
100101 12 2001 0.008 0.000398
100101 3 2002 0.0075 0.000922
100101 6 2002 0.0076 0.000893
100101 9 2002 0.0083 0.000458
 
Trade Date 
Delivery 
Month 
Contract 
Year Strike Price 
Settle 
Price 
100102 12 2002 0.0076 0.0006
100102 3 2003 0.0075 0.000738
100102 6 2003 0.0079 0.000467
100102 9 2003 0.009 0.000101
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Trade Date 
Delivery 
Month 
Contract 
Year Strike Price Settle Price 
100103 12 2003 0.008 0.001061
100103 3 2004 0.0081 0.000993
100103 6 2004 0.0084 0.000764
100103 9 2004 0.0087 0.000592
 
Trade Date 
Delivery 
Month 
Contract 
Year Strike Price 
Settle 
Price 
100104 12 2004 0.0085 0.000598
100104 3 2005 0.0084 0.000757
100104 6 2005 0.0091 0.000313
100104 9 2005 0.0093 0.000298
 
Trade Date 
Delivery 
Month 
Contract 
Year Strike Price 
Settle 
Price 
100104 12 2004 0.0085 0.000598
100104 3 2005 0.0084 0.000757
100104 6 2005 0.0091 0.000313
100104 9 2005 0.0093 0.000298
 
Trade Date 
Delivery 
Month 
Contract 
Year Strike Price 
Settle 
Price 
100305 12 2005 0.0087 0.000197
100305 3 2006 0.0087 0.000308
100305 6 2006 0.0087 0.00042
100305 9 2006 0.0097 0.000112
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Trade Date 
Delivery 
Month 
Contract 
Year Strike Price
Settle 
Price 
100206 12 2006 0.0088 0.000035
100206 3 2007 0.0088 0.000117
100206 6 2007 0.0089 0.000169
100206 9 2007 0.0089 0.000246
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